Linear and differential cryptanalysis

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Differential cryptanalysis

Overview

Differentials and differential characteristics

Quasidifferential transition matrices

Quasidifferential trails

Cost analysis

Key-recovery techniques



Differentials

Probabilistic relation between an input difference a and an output difference b

 $F(x+a) \approx F(x) + b$

▶ Pair (a, b) of differences $a \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$ and $b \in \mathbb{F}_2^m$ determines the differential

Differentials

Probabilistic relation between an input difference a and an output difference b

 $F(x+a) \approx F(x) + b$

- ▶ Pair (a, b) of differences $a \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$ and $b \in \mathbb{F}_2^m$ determines the differential
- ▶ If F is a uniform random function, then the number of inputs x such that F(x + a) = F(x) + b is $2^n/2^m$ on average
- Probability of a differential:

$$p = \frac{\#\{x \in \mathbb{F}_2^n \mid \mathsf{F}(x+a) = \mathsf{F}(x) + b\}}{2^n} = \Pr_{\mathbf{x}} \left[\mathsf{F}(\mathbf{x}+a) = \mathsf{F}(\mathbf{x}) + b\right]$$

▶ 3-bit S-box S: $\mathbb{F}_2^3 \to \mathbb{F}_2^3$

X	000	001	010	011	100	101	110	111
S(x)	111	010	100	101	001	110	011	000

▶ Differential (*a*, *b*) = (001, 001)



▶ 3-bit S-box S:
$$\mathbb{F}_2^3 \to \mathbb{F}_2^3$$

X	000	001	010	011	100	101	110	111
S(x)	111	010	100	101	001	110	011	000

• Probability
$$\Pr_{\mathbf{x}} \left[\mathsf{S}(\mathbf{x} + a) = \mathsf{S}(\mathbf{x}) + b \right] = \frac{2}{8} = \frac{1}{4}$$

- Sample q input pairs $(x_1, x_1 + a), \dots, (x_q, x_q + a)$ at random
- Average number of pairs with output difference b is pq
- q ≈ 1/p samples are enough for a distinguisher because right pairs are uncommon (assuming p is not too small or large)



Number of samples depends on true- and false-positive probabilities (see later)

Differentials



Differentials



Propagation through a sequence of operations?



$$\mathsf{Pr}[\mathsf{S}^2(oldsymbol{x}+a)=\mathsf{S}^2(oldsymbol{x})+b]pprox\mathsf{Pr}[\mathsf{S}(oldsymbol{x}+a)=\mathsf{S}(oldsymbol{x})+c ext{ and }\mathsf{S}(oldsymbol{y}+c)=\mathsf{S}(oldsymbol{y})+b]$$



Pretend that **x** and **y** are independent:

$$\Pr[\mathsf{S}^2(\boldsymbol{x}+a)=\mathsf{S}^2(\boldsymbol{x})+b] \stackrel{\boldsymbol{\&}}{\approx} \Pr[\mathsf{S}(\boldsymbol{x}+a)=\mathsf{S}(\boldsymbol{x})+c] \times \Pr[\mathsf{S}(\boldsymbol{y}+c)=\mathsf{S}(\boldsymbol{y})+b]$$



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• For example: a = b = c = 001 gives $1/4 \times 1/4 = 1/16$

Unfortunately, this is wrong (the correct result is 1/4)



$$Pr[S^{2}(x + 001) = S^{2}(x) + 001]$$

= Pr[S(x + 001) = S(x) + 001 and S(y + 001) = S(y) + 001] +
Pr[S(x + 001) = S(x) + 011 and S(y + 011) = S(y) + 001] +
Pr[S(x + 001) = S(x) + 101 and S(y + 101) = S(y) + 001] +
Pr[S(x + 001) = S(x) + 111 and S(y + 111) = S(y) + 001]
$$\underset{\approx}{\overset{\bullet}{\approx}} \frac{1}{16} + \frac{1}{16} + \frac{1}{16} + \frac{1}{16}$$



$$Pr[S^{2}(x + 011) = S^{2}(x) + 011]$$

$$= Pr[S(x + 011) = S(x) + 001 \text{ and } S(y + 001) = S(y) + 011] + Pr[S(x + 011) = S(x) + 010 \text{ and } S(y + 010) = S(y) + 011] + Pr[S(x + 011) = S(x) + 101 \text{ and } S(y + 101) = S(y) + 011] + Pr[S(x + 001) = S(x) + 110 \text{ and } S(y + 110) = S(y) + 001]$$

$$\stackrel{\$}{\approx} \frac{1}{16} + \frac{1}{16} + \frac{1}{16} + \frac{1}{16}$$

Unfortunately, this is still wrong (the correct result is 0)It is not reasonable to assume independence

Differential characteristics

Suppose
$$F = F_r \circ \cdots \circ F_2 \circ F_1$$
 and let $x_i = F_i(x_{i-1})$ with $x_0 = x$

Law of total probability:

$$\Pr[\mathsf{F}(\mathbf{x}+a_1)=\mathsf{F}(\mathbf{x})+a_{r+1}]=\sum_{a_2,\ldots,a_r}\Pr\left[\bigwedge_{i=1}^r\mathsf{F}_i(\mathbf{x}_i+a_i)=\mathsf{F}(\mathbf{x}_i)+a_{i+1}\right]$$

• A sequence $(a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_{r+1})$ is called a differential characteristic

How to calculate the probability of a characteristic?

Quasidifferential transition matrices

▶
$$2^{2m} \times 2^{2n}$$
 matrix corresponding to $F \colon \mathbb{F}_2^n \to \mathbb{F}_2^m$

$$D_{(v,b),(u,a)}^{\mathsf{F}} = \left(2\Pr_{\mathbf{x}}\left[v^{\mathsf{T}}\mathsf{F}(\mathbf{x}) = u^{\mathsf{T}}\mathbf{x} \mid \mathsf{F}(\mathbf{x}+a) = \mathsf{F}(\mathbf{x}) + b\right] - 1\right)$$
$$\times \Pr_{\mathbf{x}}\left[\mathsf{F}(\mathbf{x}+a) = \mathsf{F}(\mathbf{x}) + b\right]$$



Quasidifferential transition matrices Example



Quasidifferential transition matrices Multiplication property

▶ If $F = F_2 \circ F_1$, then

$$D^{\mathsf{F}} = D^{\mathsf{F}_2} D^{\mathsf{F}_1}$$

Proof by calculation

> This is the most important property of quasidifferential transition matrices

There are more conceptual (but more abstract) proofs without calculation

Quasidifferential transition matrices Multiplication property: example





► If
$$F = F_r \circ \cdots F_2 \circ F_1$$
, then $D^F = D^{F_r} \cdots D^{F_2} D^{F_1}$, so
$$D^F_{\varpi_{r+1}, \varpi_1} = \sum_{\varpi_2, \dots, \varpi_r} D^{F_r}_{\varpi_{r+1}, \varpi_r} \cdots D^{F_2}_{\varpi_3, \varpi_2} D^{F_1}_{\varpi_2, \varpi_2}$$

with $\varpi_i = (u_i, a_i)$ for $i \in \{1, \ldots, r\}$

• A quasidifferential trail is a sequence $(\varpi_1, \ldots, \varpi_{r+1})$ with correlation $\prod_{i=1}^r D_{\varpi_{i+1}, \varpi_i}^{\mathsf{F}_i}$

> Analysis relies on the assumption that there exists a set Λ of 'dominant trails':

$$D_{\varpi_{r+1},\varpi_1}^{\mathsf{F}} = \sum_{\varpi \in \Lambda} \prod_{i=1}^{r} D_{\varpi_{i+1},\varpi_i}^{\mathsf{F}_i} + \varepsilon$$

► $D_{(0,a_{r+1}),(0,a_1)}^{\mathsf{F}}$ is the probability of the differential (a_1, a_{r+1})

Quasidifferential trails can be used to compute the probability of a differential

Quasidifferential trails can be used to compute the probability of a characteristic:

$$\sum_{u_2,...,u_r} \prod_{i=1}^r D_{(u_{i+1},a_{i+1}),(u_i,a_i)}^{\mathsf{F}_i}$$

Proof: similar as for the multiplication property (exercise) visual proof (

Quasidifferential trails Example



▶ To analyze trails we need to determine D^{k_i} , D^S and D^P

Quasidifferential trails Bricklayer functions

► If
$$F(x_1 || x_2) = F_1(x_1) || F_2(x_2)$$
, then
 $D_{(v_1 || v_2, b_1 || b_2), (u_1 || u_2, a_1 || a_2)}^F = D_{(v_1, b_1), (u_1, a_1)}^{F_1} D_{(v_2, b_2), (u_2, a_2)}^{F_2}$

Proof by calculation

• Equivalently,
$$D^{\mathsf{F}} = D^{\mathsf{F}_1} \otimes D^{\mathsf{F}_2}$$

• For the S-box layer:
$$D^{S} = D^{S} \otimes D^{S} \otimes D^{S}$$

Quasidifferential trails Translations and linear functions

• If
$$F(x) = x + k$$
, then

$$D_{(v,b),(u,a)}^{\mathsf{F}} = egin{cases} (-1)^{v^{\mathsf{T}}k} & ext{if } u = v ext{ and } a = b \ 0 & ext{else.} \end{cases}$$



Quasidifferential trails Translations and linear functions

• If
$$F(x) = x + k$$
, then

$$D_{(v,b),(u,a)}^{\mathsf{F}} = \begin{cases} (-1)^{v^{\mathsf{T}}k} & \text{if } u = v \text{ and } a = b \\ 0 & \text{else.} \end{cases}$$

• If F(x) = Mx, then

$$D_{(v,b),(u,a)}^{\mathsf{F}} = egin{cases} 1 & ext{if } u = M^{\mathsf{T}}v ext{ and } b = Ma \ 0 & ext{else.} \end{cases}$$



Example: 3-round differential (characteristic 1)



 $\frac{1}{2^{6}}$







Example: 3-round differential (characteristic 2)



 $\frac{1}{2^8}$







Example: 3-round differential (characteristic 3)



 $\frac{1}{2^8}$















Overall probability depends on three key bits

$$egin{array}{l} rac{1}{2^6} & (1+(-1)^{\kappa_1}/2)(1+(-1)^{\kappa_2}/2) \ + rac{1}{2^8} & (1+(-1)^{\kappa_1+\kappa_3})(1+(-1)^{\kappa_1}/2) \ + rac{1}{2^8} & (1+(-1)^{\kappa_2+\kappa_3})(1+(-1)^{\kappa_2}/2) \ + rac{1}{2^{10}}(1+(-1)^{\kappa_1+\kappa_3})(1+(-1)^{\kappa_2+\kappa_3}) \ \in & igg\{rac{1}{256},rac{1}{64},rac{3}{128},rac{9}{256},rac{1}{16}igg\} \end{array}$$

 \blacktriangle Characteristics with \geq 4 active S-boxes can contribute significantly



Probability reveals something about the key (but we will see better methods later)



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Probability reveals something about the key (but we will see better methods later)

Cost analysis

• Using q independent samples x_1, \ldots, x_q (so 2q chosen plaintexts):

$$\widehat{oldsymbol{
ho}} = rac{1}{q} \# ig\{ 1 \leq i \leq q \mid \mathsf{F}(oldsymbol{x}_i + oldsymbol{a}) = \mathsf{F}(oldsymbol{x}_i) + b ig\}$$

Simplifications:

- -pq is not too small and probability p is not too large
- Probability is εp for wrong keys
- ▶ Distribution of \widehat{p} is close to normal with mean p and variance $p(1-p)/q \approx p/q$

• Hypothesis test: $\widehat{\boldsymbol{p}} \geq \varepsilon \boldsymbol{p} + t \sqrt{\varepsilon \boldsymbol{p}/q}$

Cost analysis



True-positive probability: $P_{S} = \Phi((1 - \varepsilon)\sqrt{pq} - t\sqrt{\varepsilon})$

False-positive probability: $P_{\rm F} = \Phi(-t)$

Cost analysis

Eliminating t gives

$$P_{\mathsf{S}} = \Phi ig(\Phi^{-1}(P_{\mathsf{F}}) \sqrt{arepsilon} + (1-arepsilon) \sqrt{pq} ig)$$

Inverting this gives

$$q = rac{1}{p} \left(rac{ \Phi^{-1}ig(P_{\mathsf{S}} ig) - \Phi^{-1}(P_{\mathsf{F}}) \sqrt{arepsilon}}{1-arepsilon}
ight)^2$$

If p depends on the key, need to average the formulas above

▶ $1/\varepsilon$ is sometimes called the 'signal-to-noise ratio'

This is essentially optimal *but important assumptions are made*

Key recovery

If one characteristic is dominant:

(a) Differential probability depends on the key

(b) Part of the key can be deduced from the output difference

Guessing key material from the first or last round is often more powerful



Key recovery

Basic procedure

- Count the number of right pairs per candidate key
- Filter out invalid candidate keys using the hypothesis test
- For K candidate keys, $P_{\mathsf{F}}K$ incorrect candidates remain
- Optimizations of the counting phase

Further topics

> Optimization of differential characteristics and quasidifferential trails

- Key-recovery techniques
- Multiple differentials
- Impossible differentials
- Truncated differentials
- Hash function cryptanalysis
- Geometric approach