

# A Geometric Approach to Linear Cryptanalysis

Tim Beyne

imec-COSIC, ESAT, KULeuven

December 6, 2021


The logo for KU Leuven, consisting of the text "KU LEUVEN" in white, bold, uppercase letters on a dark blue rectangular background.

**KU LEUVEN**



COSIC


# Linear cryptanalysis



$$C_{v,u}^F = 2 \times (\Pr[u^\top \mathbf{x} = v^\top F(\mathbf{x})] - \frac{1}{2})$$

- ▶ Linear distinguisher:  $1/(C_{v,u}^F)^2$  samples
- ▶ Variants/extensions:
  - Multiple- and multidimensional linear cryptanalysis
  - Invariant subspaces and nonlinear invariants
  - Zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis
  - I/O sums, partitioning, ... (nonlinear)

# Linear cryptanalysis



$$C_{v,u}^F = 2 \times (\Pr[u^\top \mathbf{x} = v^\top F(\mathbf{x})] - \frac{1}{2})$$

- ▶ Linear distinguisher:  $1/(C_{v,u}^F)^2$  samples
- ▶ Variants/extensions:
  - Multiple- and multidimensional linear cryptanalysis
  - Invariant subspaces and nonlinear invariants
  - Zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis
  - I/O sums, partitioning, ... (nonlinear)

# Goals

1. Uniform description of different variants of linear cryptanalysis
2. Generalization of approximations and the links between them
3. Alternative motivation for trails and the general piling-up principle

## Inner product space $\mathbb{C}^G$


- ▶  $\mathbb{C}^G$  = vector space of all functions  $G \rightarrow \mathbb{C}$  with  $G = \{g_1, \dots, g_l\}$

$$\mathbb{C}^G \cong \mathbb{C}^{|G|}$$
$$f \mapsto \begin{bmatrix} f(g_1) \\ \vdots \\ f(g_l) \end{bmatrix}$$


- ▶ Inner product between  $f, g \in \mathbb{C}^G$ :

$$\langle f, g \rangle = \sum_{x \in G} \overline{f(x)} g(x)$$


- ▶ Orthogonality:  $f \perp g \Leftrightarrow \langle f, g \rangle = 0$




## Input and output properties



## Input and output properties



# Input and output properties



$$\mathbb{1}_S : G \rightarrow \mathbb{C} \quad (\mathbb{1}_S \in \mathbb{C}^G)$$

$$\mathbb{1}_S(x) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } x \in S \\ 0 & \text{else} \end{cases}$$

$$\mathbb{1}_R^* : \mathbb{C}^G \rightarrow \mathbb{C} \quad (\mathbb{1}_R \in \mathbb{C}^{G^*})$$

$$\mathbb{1}_R^*(f) = \sum_{x \in R} f(x) = \langle \mathbb{1}_R, f \rangle$$

$$\mathbb{1}_R^*(\mathbb{1}_{F(S)}) = |R \cap F(S)|$$

State


function  
 $f \in \mathbb{C}^G$

'Observation' of state

linear functional  
 $g^* \in \mathbb{C}^{G^*}$



# Input and output properties



$$\mathbb{1}_S : G \rightarrow \mathbb{C} \quad (\mathbb{1}_S \in \mathbb{C}^G)$$

$$\mathbb{1}_S(x) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } x \in S \\ 0 & \text{else} \end{cases}$$

$$\mathbb{1}_R^* : \mathbb{C}^G \rightarrow \mathbb{C} \quad (\mathbb{1}_R \in \mathbb{C}^{G^*})$$

$$\mathbb{1}_R^*(f) = \sum_{x \in R} f(x) = \langle \mathbb{1}_R, f \rangle$$

$$\mathbb{1}_R^*(\mathbb{1}_{F(S)}) = |R \cap F(S)|$$

State



function  
 $f \in \mathbb{C}^G$

'Observation' of state

linear functional  
 $g^* \in \mathbb{C}^{G^*} \cong \mathbb{C}^G$   
 $g^*(f) = \langle g, f \rangle$

# Input and output properties

## Transition matrices




Transformation  $T^F$ :  $T^F \delta_x = \delta_{F(x)}$

$$\text{with } \delta_x(z) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } z = x \\ 0 & \text{else} \end{cases}$$

# Input and output properties

## Transition matrices and correlation matrices



Transformation  $T^F$ :  $T^F \delta_x = \delta_{F(x)}$

$$\text{with } \delta_x(z) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } z = x \\ 0 & \text{else} \end{cases}$$

Fourier transformation:  $\mathcal{F}_G : \mathbb{C}^G \rightarrow \mathbb{C}^{\hat{G}}$   
 $\mathcal{F}_G \chi = |G| \delta_\chi$

Diagonalizes translations ( $F(x) = x + t$ ).

Group character  $\chi$

Homomorphism  $\chi : G \rightarrow \mathbb{C} \setminus \{0\}$

$\chi(x + y) = \chi(x)\chi(y)$

# Input and output properties

## Higher-dimensional properties

- ▶ Generalization: subspace  $V \subseteq \mathbb{C}^G$  as input (output) property
- ▶ Consider all states (observation functions)  $f \in V$  at once
- ▶ Common examples:
  - Multiple linear cryptanalysis
  - Projection functions [Wagner, 2004, Baignères et al., 2004]
- ! Independence from the choice of basis for  $V$

# Goals


1. Uniform description of different variants of linear cryptanalysis  
vector spaces of functions  $G \rightarrow \mathbb{C}$  (subspaces of  $\mathbb{C}^G$ )
2. Generalization of approximations and the links between them
3. Alternative motivation for trails and the general piling-up principle

# Approximations\*

- ▶ Pair of subspaces  $U \subseteq \mathbb{C}^G$ ,  $V \subseteq \mathbb{C}^H$  with 'approximation map'  $\langle V, U \rangle_F : U \rightarrow V$

$$\langle V, U \rangle_F := \pi_V \circ T^F \circ \iota_U = \pi_{\mathcal{F}(V)} \circ C^F \circ \iota_{\mathcal{F}(U)}$$

- ▶ *Principal correlations*:  $\min\{\dim U, \dim V\}$ -largest singular values of  $\langle V, U \rangle_F$




Cosines of principal angles (F injective)

# Approximations\*

- ▶ Pair of subspaces  $U \subseteq \mathbb{C}^G$ ,  $V \subseteq \mathbb{C}^H$  with 'approximation map'  $\langle V, U \rangle_F : U \rightarrow V$

$$\langle V, U \rangle_F := \pi_V \circ T^F \circ \iota_U = \pi_{\mathcal{F}(V)} \circ C^F \circ \iota_{\mathcal{F}(U)}$$



- ▶ *Principal correlations*:  $\min\{\dim U, \dim V\}$ -largest singular values of  $\langle V, U \rangle_F$



Cosines of principal angles (F injective)


- ▶ Linear cryptanalysis ( $\dim U = \dim V = 1$ ):  
principal correlation coincides with absolute value of ordinary correlation

# Approximations




$$T^F U \subseteq V$$

- ▶ Integral attacks
- ▶ Invariant subspaces
- ▶ Nonlinear invariants



$$T^F U \perp V$$

- ▶ Zero-correlation linear approximations
- ▶ Multidimensional  $\sim$



$$\langle V, U \rangle_F$$

- ▶ (Non)linear approximations
- ▶ Multiple  $\sim$
- ▶ Multidimensional  $\sim$
- ▶ Partitioning




# Goals

1. Uniform description of different variants of linear cryptanalysis  
vector spaces of functions  $G \rightarrow \mathbb{C}$  (subspaces of  $\mathbb{C}^G$ )
2. Generalization of approximations and the links between them  
pairs of subspaces  $U \subseteq \mathbb{C}^G$ ,  $V \subseteq \mathbb{C}^H$  with approximation map  $\langle V, U \rangle_F : U \rightarrow V$
3. Alternative motivation for trails and the general piling-up principle

# Trails\*

## Traditional piling-up principle

$$\text{Correlation } c = 2 \Pr[u_1^\top \mathbf{x}_1 = u_{r+1}^\top \mathbf{x}_{r+1}] - 1?$$




- ▶ Piling-up principle:  $c \approx \prod_{i=1}^r c_i$  (correlation of trail)
- ▶ Motivation:
  - Markov cipher assumption (equivalent to averaging over independent round keys)
    - ❗ Requires taking into account round key masks
  - Dominant trail hypothesis (follows from [Daemen et al., 1995])

# Trails\*

## General piling-up principle

Approximation map  $\langle U_{r+1}, U_1 \rangle_{F_r \circ \dots \circ F_1}$ ?



- Piling-up principle:

$$\langle U_{r+1}, U_1 \rangle_{F_r \circ \dots \circ F_1} = \langle U_{r+1}, U_r \rangle_{F_r} \circ \dots \circ \langle U_3, U_2 \rangle_{F_2} \circ \langle U_2, U_1 \rangle_{F_1} + E$$

(see Theorem 5.1 for error term  $E$ )

- Geometric motivation: successive orthogonal projection

# Conclusion

1. Uniform description of different variants of linear cryptanalysis  
vector spaces of functions  $G \rightarrow \mathbb{C}$  (subspaces of  $\mathbb{C}^G$ )
  2. Generalization of approximations and the links between them  
pairs of subspaces  $U \subseteq \mathbb{C}^G$ ,  $V \subseteq \mathbb{C}^H$  with approximation map  $\langle V, U \rangle_F : U \rightarrow V$
  3. Alternative motivation for trails and the general piling-up principle  
process of successive orthogonal projection
- ▶ More results and applications in the paper






<https://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~tbeyne/geometric>



[tim.beyne@esat.kuleuven.be](mailto:tim.beyne@esat.kuleuven.be)

# References I

-  Baignères, T., Junod, P., and Vaudenay, S. (2004).  
How far can we go beyond linear cryptanalysis?  
In Lee, P. J., editor, *ASIACRYPT 2004*, volume 3329 of *LNCS*, pages 432–450, Jeju Island, Korea. Springer, Heidelberg, Germany.
-  Daemen, J., Govaerts, R., and Vandewalle, J. (1995).  
Correlation matrices.  
In Preneel, B., editor, *FSE'94*, volume 1008 of *LNCS*, pages 275–285, Leuven, Belgium. Springer, Heidelberg, Germany.
-  Wagner, D. (2004).  
Towards a unifying view of block cipher cryptanalysis.  
In Roy, B. K. and Meier, W., editors, *FSE 2004*, volume 3017 of *LNCS*, pages 16–33, New Delhi, India. Springer, Heidelberg, Germany.